Is it possible to buy plutonium

August 18, TWO years ago, when plutonium traces were found in a car abandoned on the Munich autobahn, the implications of such nuclear smuggling made it one of the main threats to peace and security.

In the flush of the post-cold-war period and the hopes for warm working relations with Moscow, this fact was not given top priority by either the Bush or Clinton administrations. However, detective work by German authorities that resulted in four arrests of those selling illegal weapons-grade plutonium this summer should keep the problem on the front burner. In the past week, two seizures of fissionable material originating in the former Soviet Union have been made.

Despite admiration for German security, the real question is: How much material is getting through? Last Wednesday German police stopped a private Spanish-Colombian operation that would have delivered 8. It takes 17 pounds of such plutonium to make a standard-size bomb; but smaller amounts can wreak havoc on civil society if used as a terrorist weapon.

A German businessman arrested in May admits to having Iraqi contacts. One lesson of the Gulf war is that states desiring to stand up to the US will seek some nuclear cabability. Two years ago experts pooh-poohed the idea of ex-Soviet nuclear stockpiles being raided or plundered. Yet waning discipline in the ex-Soviet Army, its need for cash, and, most important, the astounding rise of mafia control in Moscow and chaos in former Soviet states makes this a live threat.

The Clinton administration conducted a nuclear proliferation policy review for the United Nations last September, concluding that nuclear terrorism was the No. Still, it is not clear the White House is adequately seized by the issue. In post-Soviet Moscow, three large mafia organizations are running the city. Whether they have an interest in moving the society to a civil order is unknown. A state takes responsibility for collective security and safety; with a mafia, anything is possible.

Once target rods are loaded into the reactor, they're bombarded for a period of three to twelve months. As neutrons collide with the targets, some of them are absorbed by neptunium atoms. That creates a new neptunium isotope, neptunium, which radioactively decays into plutonium. When irradiation is complete, the targets go back into a hot cell. The rods are dissolved with a caustic solution and the radioactive material inside, now 12 to 14 percent plutonium, is again dissolved in nitric acid.

A process called solvent extraction isolates the plutonium and neptunium: Solvents are added to the solution that dissolve only those elements. Then scientists induce the solution to separate—like oil and water—so that they can remove the solvent that's bound to them. At this point, neptunium is separated and can be passed through the cycle again. The plutonium is purified through a process called ion exchange, which Oak Ridge is still refining—a key step to reaching the 1.

Fully refined, the plutonium powder is packed into stainless-steel canisters designed for transporting radioactive materials. This story appears in the September issue. Type keyword s to search. Today's Top Stories. The water that cools and helps stabilize the HFIR glows blue because of Cherenkov radiation—the result of excited electrons moving through water faster than light.

By Rob Edwards. It seems only a matter of time before a terrorist group acquires the ultimate bargaining chip. It reveals gaping holes in their ability to detect nuclear smuggling, worrying flaws in their audits of radioactive materials and serious shortages of trained staff, equipment and resources. None of the 11 countries has any radiation monitoring equipment covering its unfenced borders, where there are few roads, railways or settlements.

One of the countries had no radiation monitoring equipment at any of its borders.